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Cornhusker Economics
Examining the Role of the Crop Insurance Selling Agent
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . ..
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

3-27-20

*126.00

*

*

198.82

179.59

166.36

170.00

146.74

139.67

228.20

206.34

255.07

*

*

*

79.80

64.05

75.76

381.53

160.41

162.63

140.93

424.41

433.70

4.10

4.10

4.44

3.44

3.64

3.04

7.92

8.36

8.19

5.48

5.74

5.38

3.26

3.18

2.96

*

*

*

*

90.00

95.00

85.00

161.50

141.58

198.00

47.50

50.67

54.37

112.50

*

The United States Department of Agriculture, Risk
Management Agency (RMA) partners with private
insurance companies to deliver the federal crop
insurance program through agents who sell policies directly to producers. The government subsidizes producers in the form of premium discounts
and reimburses private insurance companies for
administrative and operating (A&O) costs. The
government provides further assistance to the industry by offering a cooperative reinsurance
agreement that reduces loss exposure for insurance companies (Appel and Borba, 2009).
Subsidization of private market players may facilitate rent-seeking behavior—efforts to capture larger shares of tax dollars devoted to the program—
especially in the settings of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection
which typically characterize crop insurance markets (Glauber, 2012; Lusk, 2016; Smith, Glauber,
and Dismukes, 2016). Ker and Ergun (2007) show
that insurance companies can use private information in the reinsurance market to generate excess returns, which go uncaptured by the government’s premium-setting mechanism. Similarly,
Coble, Dismukes, and Glauber (2007) show that
crop insurance companies take individual policyholder characteristics into account when allocating policies to reinsurance funds—ceding high
risk policies to the government and retaining safe
policies for themselves. Rejesus et al. (2004) consider the role of the selling agent and find evidence
of collusion between crop insurance agents, producers, and insurance adjusters. Our work extends
the cropinsuranceliterature by investigating the
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potential for selling agents to influence producers’
choices of insurance coverage.
The Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) establishes the guidelines under which the government, private insurance companies, and crop insurance agents
operate and interact. Authorized private insurance
companies sell and service insurance products and
share underwriting gains and losses withthe Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). The government
provided A&O reimbursement, calculated as a proportion of total premiums, covers agent commissions,
adjustor costs, and regulatory compliance. Insurance
companies allocate their total premiums net of A&O
subsidies, or net book premium, between two FCIC
reinsurance funds: the Assigned Risk Fund, in which
insurance companies cede most of their risk exposure
to the government, and the Commercial Fund, where
insurance companies retain more risk but enjoy a larger share of any underwriting gains. Crop insurance
agents act as intermediaries between farmers and insurance companies by procuring policies from producers and selling their portfolio of contracts, referred
to as the book of business, to authorized insurance
companies.
Agent compensation is proportional to the total
amount of insurance transferred to insurance companies (total premiums), though the percentage of premium transferred (commission rate) may be influenced by the actuarial value of the book of business as
determined by underwriting gains or losses (Rejesus et
al., 2004; Walters et al., 2010). Hence, the agents’ incentives include the maximization of premiums collected from farmers and optimization of the actuarial
performance of the policies they sell to insurance companies. We refer to these motivations as the volume
incentive (premiums collected) and the quality incentive (actuarial performance).
The SRA restricts agent behavior in two important
ways. First, neither agents nor insurance companies
can influence the premium for a given policy type under penalty of being banned from the industry (Pearcy
and Smith, 2015). Second, an agent operating in a state
must sell any approved policy to a producer who requests it. Agents cannot compete with other agents on
the basis of premium price or refuse the business of
high-risk farmers (Glauber, 2004). However, agents
may pursue rents by writing contracts for insurance
products and coverage levels that maximize the agents’

total compensation—premium commission
(volume incentive) plus book-of-business value
(quality incentive)—which may not maximize
producer outcomes. In this context, we define
agent rent-seeking as pursuing excess profit by
selling coverage that would not be chosen by the
producer in the absence of agent influence. This
definition of agent rent-seeking does not specifically include the case of collusion between producers and insurance adjusters (Rejesus et al.,
2004).
When choosing a crop insurance product, farmers select from a menu of options including the
coverage level, policy type (individual [revenue
vs. yield] vs. area protection), unit structure, and
price election. Insurance product characteristic
combinations can easily number in the hundreds,
making many producers reliant on agent expertise(Schnitkey and Sherrick, 2017). Agents with
large market shares or few competitors may take
advantage of these and other information asymmetries to maximize their compensation. More
comprehensive insurance policies carry higher
premiums which increase agent compensation.
Alternatively, if an agent expects an insurance
customer to suffer large losses, the quality incentive may lead the agent to minimize the insurance
company’s exposure.
We examine how agent market share and the
market concentration of agents influencethe crop
insurance contract decisions of producers. We
model the interaction between a representative
crop insurance agent and producer and examine
how competition among agents impacts their
selling behavior. We hypothesize that the effect of
a decrease in agent competition on producers depends on the agent’s beliefs about the producer’s
risk of loss and the agent compensation mechanism, which may vary by region. We test these
hypotheses using crop insurance contract level
data from five states with different growing conditions and crops: Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Montana, and Washington. For each state, we
estimate the relationship between measures of
agent market competition (market share and
market concentration) and the insurance coverage choices of producers (policy coverage level,
premium, and insured liability). For our

analysis, we focus on the producer coverage level
choice as this decision directly influences the
amount of liability transfer and therefore potential
indemnities and premiums.
Discussion and Implications
We model the interaction between a representative
crop insurance agent and producer.Using a comprehensive unit level dataset covering over 400,000
individual crop insurance contracts across five
states, we test the impact of agent market share and
agent market concentration on the coverage choices
of producers. We hypothesize that market competition affects an agent’s ability to influence the insurance decisions of producers and that the direction
of the effect depends on the producer’s risk level
and the importance of the quality incentive for
agents.
In general, we find that both agent market share
and market concentration are associated with higher coverage levels, policy premiums, and insured
liability but the economic magnitude of these effects
is small, suggesting limited market influence by
agents. Agent market shares are positively correlated with insurance coverage in Iowa, Nebraska, and
Montana, while overall agent concentration is positively related to coverage in Iowa and Nebraska.
Small positive relationships between insurance coverage and agent market shares and concentrations
point to the existence of a weak volume incentive
for insurance agents. Evidence that agents distinguish between high and low-risk producers, and
therefore that the quality incentive matters for
agents, is limited and not consistent across locations.
The incentives of crop insurance agents have implications for taxpayers who subsidize the federal crop
insurance program. A mechanism through which
agents can benefit taxpayers depends on insurance
companies rewarding agents with high commission
rates for policies that contribute to underwriting
gains, i.e. the quality incentive must be meaningful
for agents. Where agent commissions do not reflect
actuarial performance, or when the volume incentive dominates, limiting competition could hurt
taxpayers by incentivizing agents to raise coverage
and risk exposure. However, our results indicate
that marginal changes in agent competition are unlikely to produce these effects on a large scale.

The relative power of crop insurance agents to crop
insurance companies may partially explain the weak
influence of agents over producers found in this paper. Agents—particularly those with loyal customers—can shop around their books of business to insurance companies who attract agents with profitsharing agreements. Given that the underwriting
gains or lossesof insurance companies are calculated
at the state level, as well as the reinsurance channels
and A&O cost-reimbursements made available to
crop insurance companies by the federal government, the actuarial performance of any one agent’s
book of business may not be a significant factor in
their compensation. Moreover, production shocks
such as drought or excess precipitation are typically
experienced on a large scale. Variation in risk between agents’ books of business in a single time period will be less important than year-to-year variation
in a company’s state-wide underwriting gains.
The policy implications drawn from our findings can
be summarized as follows: the influence of crop insurance agents over the decisions of producers is
driven both by the incentives provided by insurance
companies and policymakers and in small part by
the level of competition among agents. Policymakers
wishing to improve the performance of the federal
crop insurance program for various stakeholders
should consider both forces.
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